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The Case of Baby K: Exploring the Concept

of Medical Futility
Mark A. Bonanno *

INTRODUCrION

Withholding and withdrawing medical treatment near the end
of life is a constant source of legal and ethical debate. In the

1970s and 1980s, a steady stream of "right-to-die" and "right to
refuse treatment" actions brought physicians and patients into
courtrooms across the country.' The question in these cases was
whether the interest of a patient in refusing life-saving medical
treatment was superior to the interests of health care providers
and the interests of states in steadfastly preserving life. With
some exceptions, patients prevailed. 2 Now the theoretical question has been turned around: whether the interest of a patient in
demanding life-saving medical treatment is to be honored when
health care providers decide such treatment is medically not

beneficial or warranted. In the most recent conflicts, patients
demanding treatment face resistance from physicians seeking to
withhold or withdraw medical care. Relying on the principle of

patient autonomy, the patient or a surrogate family member instructs the doctor to continue administering medical care, such
as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or mechanical ventilator assistance, because even though the chance for survival is
* Mark Bonanno received his Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon and his Masters of
Public Health degree from Boston University School of Public Health.
1. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. den., 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977).
2. Although the Court in Cruzan recognized that a person could refuse life-saving
medical treatment, it held that clear and convincing evidence was required of an incompetent's wish to withdraw treatment, a procedural requirement that Nancy
Cruzan's parents did not meet. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 280.
3. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 91 (1994) (considering declaratory action to refuse
life-supporting care to anencephalic infant).
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minimal, there is value to each additional moment of the patient's life.4
A physician may seek to terminate treatment as medically futile because in his or her opinion the additional procedures or
tests will yield no net benefit to the patient. 5 In extreme cases,
health care providers are asking courts to decide whether or not
treatment may be withheld from a patient. 6 From scant opinions, courts are inclined to rely on the wishes of a patient or
surrogate family member.7 These decisions are being criticized
because, as current political consensus builds toward the devel-

opment of a health care system that secures universal access to
medicine within economic constraints, the provision of treatment that is not beneficial is closely questioned.8
In October of 1992, a baby girl was born in Virginia who unknowingly became a symbol of medical futility. 9 Baby K was

anencephalic, 10 and as a result should have died a few days after

4. In the Baby K case, an anencephalic baby's mother did not want ventilator
treatment discontinued because she believed that "all human life has value, including
her anencephalic daughter's life." Id. at 1026.
5. Robert M. Veatch & Carol Mason Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the
Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 16 (1992) (describing the concept
of medically futile care).
6. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022.
7. See, e.g., In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Prob. Ct. Hennepin Co., Minn. 1991),
reprinted in [1991 Transfer Binder] II BioLaw (Univ. Pub. Am.) U:2161, U:2164; John
J. Paris et al., Physician's Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L, 322
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1012, 1013 (1990).
8. See Ann MacLean Massie, Withdrawal of Treatment for Minors in a Persistent
Vegetative State: Parents Should Decide, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 173 (1993); see also Ann
Alpers & Bernard Lo, Futility: Not Just a Medical Issue, 21 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
327 (1992); Lance K. Steil, Stopping Treatment on Grounds of Futility: A Role for
Institutional Policy, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 481 (1992); Edward B. Hirshfeld,
Should Ethical and Legal Standardsfor PhysiciansBe Changed to Accommodate New
Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1809 (1992).
9. See 832 F. Supp. 1022. Generally, the debate surrounding medical "futility" is a
medical, legal, and ethical debate that pits a patient's desire to receive treatment
against the physician's medical judgment that no benefit would be achieved. In other
words, the expenditure of medical resources toward a goal of improving the health
status of a patient is thought to be futile. However, the public has voiced its views as
well. See, e.g., Dateline Feedback; Response from Viewers on Whether Baby Born with
No Brain Should Be Kept Alive (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 28, 1995). Baby K
died on April 5, 1995. See Marylou Tousignant & Bill Miller, Death of "Baby K"
Leaves a Legacy of Legal Precedents, Apr. 7, 1995, at B03.
10. Anencephaly is a medical condition characterized by an incomplete brain; that

is, the brain is "entirely or substantially absent."

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE

STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE

ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND 'LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 202 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]. Specifically, anencephaly is defined as a congenitally
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birth. However, when she began having trouble breathing, physicians provided her with assistance through the use of a
machine called a ventilator. At the insistence of her mother,
ventilator treatment was administered in subsequent episodes of
difficult breathing and, remarkably, this cycle of medical care

kept her from dying for over two years." Her physicians believed the continued provision of this kind of treatment was fu-

tile because she had no chance for a conscious life. Thus, they
recommended that the hospital seek a court order allowing

them to refuse ventilator treatment during a future episode of
difficult breathing. 12 The district court said refusing to provide
treatment would violate federal law;13 seven months later the

Fourth Circuit agreed.' 4 Consequently, the case has fueled a
growing debate in the medical and legal communities about a

patient's right to demand medical treatment that a physician
does not want to provide.' 5

This article discusses the manner in which courts have responded to the medical futility debate by highlighting the Baby
K decisions and their effect on the practice of medicine. The

following questions are then considered. Should a medical or
legal definition of medical futility be developed for use in hospi-

tals and courts? While general agreement exists that a patient
may refuse treatment in life-threatening situations, may a patient similarly demand treatment even though the physician believes treatment is not warranted, especially when the result will

most likely be death? May health care providers simply respond
defective development of the brain, with absence of the bones of the cranial vault, the
cerebral and cerebellar hemispheres, a rudimentary brainstem,.and traces of basal
ganglia. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 75 (25th ed. 1990).
11. See Marylou Tousignant & Bill Miller, Baby K's Mother Gives Her the Prayer
That Many Deny She Has, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1994, at A01.
12. The hospital involved in the litigation is Fairfax Hospital located in Falls
Church, Virginia. Linda Greenhouse, Court Order to Treat Baby with Partial Brain
Prompts Debate on Costs and Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 20.
13. 832 F. Supp. at 1031.
14. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
15. "The case of 'Baby K'... has become an emotional tug of war over issues such
as parents' rights, medical ethics and who should decide what is proper medical treatment for a patient." Bill Miller & Marilou Tousignant, Mother Fights Hospital to
Keep Infant Alive, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1993, at A01. "Under [the court's definition
of disabled] a hospital or doctor could be guilty of discrimination if they refused to
perform brain surgery on the baby just because she didn't have a brain. There is a
difference between discrimination and medical judgment." Ellen Goodman, The Shift
from Dr. Partnerto Dr. Provider,BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1993, at 85; Linda Greenhouse, HospitalAppeals Ruling on TreatingBaby Born with Most of Brain Gone, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at A10 (describing opposing views on the court decision).
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will not be provided
to patients that a certain medical procedure
6
because "we don't do that here"?1
Section I provides a brief overview of the futility debate by
reporting on variations in definitions, and then looking at the
application of the concept from medical and legal perspectives.
Section II discusses the most recent case law entering the debate, and focuses on the controversial Baby K opinion, which
appears to stifle physician decision making in the doctor-patient
relationship by granting broad patient authority to dictate the
course of medical treatment regardless of the benefit provided.
Section III examines the reasoning of the court opinions, and
further analyzes medical futility in the context of providing
health care services in the United States. Given the recent call
for national health care reform, there may be a conflict unfolding between protecting the rights of individual patients such
as Baby K and achieving societal goals of maintaining a health
care system that is cost effective, of high quality, and universally
accessible. Finally, Section IV attempts to clarify some of the
confusion stemming from the Baby K decision, and offers a few
suggestions for better resolution of these cases without resorting
to litigation.
I.

DEFINING MEDICAL FUTILITY: NOT A SIMPLE TASK

Medical futility-an imprecise term wielded by doctors,
bioethicists, and lawyers to classify the justification for terminating medical treatment that is not beneficial-has emerged from
our current struggle to create a comprehensive health care system, and challenged the notion that patients should be given all
therapies medicine has to offer without regard for cost or anticipated quality of life. While the concepts underlying the futility
debate may be traced to an earlier patients' rights movement in
right-to-die cases, the issue is more complex because a consensus about denying patients medical treatment they desire (rather
than refuse) is much harder to achieve. 17 Our reliance on lifesaving technology to produce miracles, together with a steady
erosion of doctor decision-making authority, and societal pressure to contain health care costs all lurk in the background of
this discussion.
16. John J. Paris et al., Beyond Autonomy-Physicians' Refusal to Use Life-Prolonging ExtracorporealMembrane Oxygenation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 354, 357
(1993).
17. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 5, at 16.
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Drafting a medical or legal definition of futility may avoid
confusion in deciding when treatment should be withheld, but
fashioning terminology for physicians to point to as authority for
denying care may decrease patient involvement in medical decision making. Futility is moving from hallway consultations on
hospital rounds into the courtroom; consequently, these legal
decisions will most likely reshape the nature of the concept.
A.

Origins of the Futility Debate

Patient contradiction of a physician's futility decision is not
surprising given the evolution of medicine from a simple relationship between the doctor and patient to our current complex
health care system of doctors, allied health professionals, hospi-

tals, public and private insurers, ethics committees, the patient,
and the patient's family members; each potentially engaged in

decision making regarding an episode of medical care.18 This
challenge to physician authority was readily apparent in Bouvia
v. Superior Court, where a patient suffering from a severe form
of cerebral palsy wanted to die.' 9 Her physicians insisted on
care, but the court held she could forgo artificial hydration and

nutrition even though such action would result in her death.2 °
In contrast, the futility debate puts a physician in the position of
refusing to provide treatment, contrary to the patient's desire to
attempt to prolong life. 21 However, the well-founded principle
of patient autonomy indicates that any such unilateral decision
attempted by a health care provider will be challenged.22
18. In the early 1980s, Paul Starr observed that "[elmerging developments [in
medicine] now jeopardize the profession's control of markets, organizations, and standards of judgment. The profession has benefited from state protection and political
accommodation of its interests, but government is no longer so sympathetic and physicians are no longer the single, dominating claimant in the medical industry." PAUL
STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 421 (1982).

19. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); see also KENNETH R.

WING, THE LAW AND THE

PUBLIC'S HEALTH 102-107 (3d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1990) (discussing right-to-die cases).
20. 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301, 306 (stating that this right of a competent adult to refuse
medical treatment, including that which would prolong or save the person's life, is one
that is basic and fundamental).
21. "Suddenly we see a reversal. A patient or family says, 'Do everything,' while
the physician says, 'Stop.'" E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The

Casualties of Coercion, HASTINGS

CENTER REP.,

Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 33, 33.

22. Marcia Angell, The Case of Helga Wanglie-A New Kind of "Right to Die"
Case, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 511, 571 (1991) (arguing that futility conflicts are a form
of earlier right-to-die cases because they affirm the right of the family to make decisions about life-sustaining treatment); see Troyen A. Brennan, Physicians and Futile

Care: Using Ethics Committees to Slow the Momentum, 21 L. MED. & HEALTH

CARE

336, 337-38 (1992) (futility debate is a side effect of the right-to-die movement).
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In addition to roots in right-to-die principles, technological innovation that sustains body functions for longer periods has
played a role in shaping the futility concept. Patients, and even
doctors, expect modern medicine to cure every ailment. 23
Medicine offers us life extension through high technology procedures such as organ transplantation and gene therapy.24 As a
result of the narrow focus on sustaining a patient for days or
even months, both health care providers and families may disregard quality of life considerations when patients are unable to
make their own choices. 25 This distinction between quantity and
quality in defining life, which medical technology makes us con26
template, is apparent when patients demand futile treatment.
Further, the modernization of medicine from the private inter-

personal house call to an efficient production-line office visit has
led to an erosion of the doctor-patient relationship, and, conse23.

See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SO16 (1987) (discussing our reliance on medical technology); GEORGE J. ANNAS,
STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS 215 (1993) (stating we have
been taught to demand medical technologies that are touted as miracles that can cure
us); ALAN D. LIEBERSON, ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES 30 (1992 & Supp. 1994)
(doctors trained that death is the enemy); Mildred Z. Solomon, How Physicians Talk
About Futility: Making Words Mean Too Many Things, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 231,
236 (1993) (we believe medical progress will alleviate all human ills).
24. See generally LIEBERSON, supra note 23, at 26 (discussing the technology explosion). In addition to more complex technologies, more common procedures may
be culprits as well. Recent commentary suggests that medical futility arose out of
studies demonstrating the inefficacy of cardiopulmonary resuscitation. See also Judith
F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: PatientAutonomy v. a Physician's ProfessionalConscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1253-54 (1993); Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Predicting the Outcome of Unsuccessful Prehospital Advanced Cardiac Life Support, 270
JAMA 1433 (1993) (prehospital advanced cardiac life support); Marni J. Bonnin et
al., Distinct Criteriafor Termination of Resuscitation in the Out-of-Hospital Setting,
270 JAMA 1457 (survival rates for out-of-hospital cardiac arrests) (1993); William A.
Gray, PrehospitalResuscitation: The Good, the Bad, and the Futile, 270 JAMA 1471,
1472 (1993) (recommending systematic changes in termination of prehospital unsuccessful resuscitation); Don Colburn, Futile Care in CardiacArrest Cases; When Heart
Can'tBe Restarted on the Scene, There's Little More a Hospital Can Do, WASH. POST,
Oct. 5, 1993, at Z07.
25. See ANNAS, supra note 23, at 216-17.
26. Death is a technical phenomenon obtained by a cessation of care, a cessation determined in a more or less avowed way by a decision of the doctor
and the hospital team. Indeed, in the majority of cases the dying person has
already lost consciousness. Death has been dissected, cut into tits by a series of little steps, which finally makes it impossible to know which step was
the real death, the one in which consciousness was lost, or the one in which
breathing stopped.
LIEBERSON, supra note 23, at 29-30; Thomas Wm. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the
"Right to Die," 49 MD. L. REV. 103, 154 (1990) (quoting PHILLIPE ARIES, WESTERN
CIETY

ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH: FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE PRESENT 88-89

(1974)).
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quently, an emerging distrust of doctors making medical decisions.27 Because patients have been empowered with more
decision-making authority in medical treatment, doctors may be
looking for ways to retain control by hanging treatment decisions on the concept of medical futility. With the treatment labeled as futile, the physician preempts further communication
with the patient or family members about how the patient will

die. Finally, in the background and possibly foreground of this
debate are financial concerns, as we face the challenge of developing a cost-efficient health care system. Compared with the
right-to-die issue, the emerging futility debate appears to be
28
more complexly motivated.
B.

Formulatinga Medical or Legal Definition

In general, the concept of medical futility is poorly defined
and frequently misused in the clinical setting. 29 Various commentators have described the futility discussion: "an elusive con-

cept,' ' 30 "a war of words, '31 "the problem-without-a-name, ' 32
"the newest addition [] to the lexicon of bioethics, 33 and "a
highly dangerous concept." 3 The problem with developing a

standard clinical definition of medical futility is that the concept
contains value judgments about the quality of the patient's life.
As a consequence, what may be considered by one physician 3to
be futile may not be to the patient or even another physician. 1
27. LIEBERSON, supra note 23, at 574 (quoting Alan Meisel, head of the Medical
Ethics Center at the University of Pittsburgh, who stated that increasing antagonism
between health care providers and patients is evidence of the deterioration of the
doctor-patient relationship).
28. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1989 & Supp. 1994).
29. Ronald Cranford & Lawrence Gostin, Futility:A Concept in Search of a Definition, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 307, 307 (1992).
30. John D. Lantos et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 Am.J.
MED. 81, 83 (1989).
31. Morreimn, supra note 21, at 33.
32. Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The Problem-Without-aName, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 30, 30.
33. Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1560
(1992).
34. Cranford & Gostin, supra note 29, at 309.
35. Solomon, supra note 23, at 232, 235. This difficulty with agreeing on a futility
definition was readily apparent at the Washington Hospital Center's Seventh Annual
Bioethics Conference in 1993. Seventh Annual Bioethics Conference, Medical Futility: Is There Consensus?, Washington Hospital Center, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 20,
1993). During one part of the conference, attendees were asked to develop a process
for determining medical futility. A mix of physicians, nurses, social workers, clergy,
legislators, attorneys, administrators, psychologists, and clinical staff noted much debate in coming to an agreement on a working definition of futility, or even what crite-
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In 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
reported on issues arising from the decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment. 6 In its discussion about seriously ill
newborns, assessments were made regarding the forgoing of
treatment for certain types of conditions. "When there is no
therapy that can benefit an infant, as in anencephaly or certain
severe cardiac deformities, a decision by surrogates and providers not to try predictably futile endeavors is ethically and legally
justifiable.

'37

While there was apparent agreement that "futile

endeavors" should not be carried out, there did not appear to be
much guidance addressing what was actually futile. Currently,

there are few statutory guidelines on making futility decisions
other than state-level "do not resuscitate order" or "advance
medical directive" legislation.38 Much debate has surfaced over

whether or not to develop criteria for allowing physicians to
withdraw treatment based on futility.
Those supporting the concept of medical futility generally ar-

gue that physicians must be able to make medical judgments
about the course of patient care. To yield to the demands of
patients, or more likely their families, when treatment is judged
of "no benefit" would undermine medical ethics and lessen the
dignity of the dying patient. 39 "Do we not recognize the authorria should go into a determination of futility in the clinical setting. As one lecturer
commented, this issue is probably like pornography in that you simply know it when
you see it. Robert M. Arnold, Address at the Seventh Annual Bioethics Conference,
Medical Futility: Theory v. Practice, Washington Hospital Center, Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 20, 1993); see also Truog et al., supra note 33, at 1560 (1992) (stating futility may
be like pornography in that clinicians may not be able to define it, but they know it
when they see it).
36. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 10.
37. Id. at 219.
38. Both Georgia and New York attempted to define the term "medically futile"
in respective "do not resuscitate" statutes. New York defines the term similarly to
Georgia: medically futile "means that cardiopulmonary resuscitation will be unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory function or that the patient will experience
repeated arrest in a short time period before death occurs." GA. CODE ANN. § 31-392 (1993); N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2961 (McKinney 1994).
39. Is there a right on the part of a competent, but dying, patient to vigorous
life-extending treatment when there is little medical reason to think it will be
efficacious? That would be a strange claim. A patient has a right only to ask
medicine to do that which is compatible with its proper goals. Those goals
cannot encompass an effort to extend a life in the face of a wholly bleak
medical prognosis: health cannot thereby be promoted. Discretion and sensitivity in the doctor-patient relationship will be required in a refusal to provide wanted though useless treatment. The physician should make clear that
he or she cannot provide useless or inappropriate care which will neither do
the patient any good nor bring honor to the practice of medicine.
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ity of the physician to place at least some limitations on patients'

demands for treatment?... [P]hysicians must be able to employ
reasonable, socially validated value judgments to restrict the alternative offered to patients, for the sake of both physician integrity and patient autonomy."' In extreme cases, as with
anencephaly, the physician should not feel obligated to provide

cure-oriented care and should simply respond "we don't do that
here."4

On the other hand, some are skeptical about defining medical
futility. Their main fear is that physicians should not be allowed
to unilaterally forgo medical treatment when the decision is
largely based on a value judgment rather than concrete medical
criteria or statistics.42 Patients are just as qualified to make
these value-laden determinations. 43 "When the alternative is

death, the question of whether going for a long-shot chance of
recovering consciousness is worth it is quite obviously a question
of values, rather than a technical medical question doctors are
especially professionally qualified to decide." 44 The term itself
is arguably too vague, 5 and some urge that we move beyond the

narrow futility discussion because the46 problems of setting limits
in health care are societal decisions.

supra note 23, at 176-77.
40. Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264
JAMA 1276, 1277 (1990).
41. Paris et al., supra note 16, at 357. In light of a growing consensus for national
health reform, the futility debate also may represent the fray of discussion about affording accessible and affordable basic medical care. That is, "[w]e could not afford a
universal health care system based on patients' demands. Such a system would irrationally allocate health care to socially powerful people with strong preferences for
immediate treatment to the disadvantage of those with less power or less immediate
needs." Steven H. Miles, Informed Demandfor "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512, 514 (1991).
42. See Barbara Springer Edwards, Deciding What was Best for Baby Rena,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1991 at A14 (Letters to the Editor) (we should not allow physicians to impose their own views and biases on the patient and family).
43. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 5, at 36.
44. Felicia Ackerman, The Significance of a Wish, HASTINGS CENTER REP., JulyAug. 1991, at 27, 27.
45. Solomon, supra note 23, at 231 (should not be used to guide decision making
near the end of life); Cranford & Gostin, supra note 29, at 307 (no consensus on a
definition).
46. LIEBERSON, supra note 23, at 573 (quoting Susan M. Wolf, an ethicist at New
York's Hastings Center, who stated society should set the limits); Robert D. Truog,
Beyond Futility, 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 143, 144 (1992) (futility is one new buzzword
we would be better off without); Morreim, supra note 21, at 33 (calling the futility
debate largely futile).
CALLAHAN,
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Because there is no definitional consensus and because patients will disagree with physicians, the issue of medical futility
will be deliberated in the courts. Arguments on both sides of
the debate are reflected in preliminary case law analyzing the
denial or withdrawal of care deemed medically futile by the
health care provider.
II.

FUTILITY IN THE COURTS: THE CASE OF BABY

K

Currently, only a few cases of health care providers seeking to
withhold medical care contrary to patient demands have
reached the courtrooms. One of the first cases involved an elderly woman who tragically suffered a heart attack soon after
hospitalization for a hip fracture.4 7 She never regained consciousness, and lived for over a year in a persistent vegetative
state.4 8 The hospital asked the court to appoint a guardianother than the patient's husband-so that an objective determination could be made about the course of medical care. 9 The
court refused because it determined the husband was the best
person to be her guardian. As a result, the woman died still
supported by a ventilator.
In another case, a two-year-old girl with severe neurological
injury was being kept alive by mechanical ventilation and cardiovascular support.50 Physicians and hospital personnel agreed
that aggressive medical intervention was not in the baby's best
interests; however, the mother demanded treatment. 5 ' Before
the probate court, the hospital challenged the mother's decision.
Even though the judge indicated a preference to comply with
the mother's interests, the case became moot when
the baby was
52
transferred to a hospital willing to provide care.
In a recent situation, parties asked the court to decide what
medical treatment physicians were obligated to provide to Baby
47. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Prob. Ct. Hennepin Co., Minn. 1991), reprinted
in [1991 Transfer Binder] II BioLaw (Univ. Pub. Am.) U:2161, U:2166.
48. Id.
49. The hospital did not ask the court to consider the legal obligation to continue
treatment that physicians concluded was not beneficial. If an independent guardian
had determined respirator treatment was not beneficial, then a second hearing probably would have been convened about the legality of withholding treatment. Miles,
supra note 41, at 513.
50. Paris et al., supra note 7 at 1012.
51. Id. at 1013.
52. Id.
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K. 53 Both the federal district court opinion and court of appeals
panel decision illustrate how judicial intervention responded to
the issue of medical futility.
Baby K was born on October 13, 1992 and Fairfax Hospital
immediately provided her with mechanical ventilator treatment
to assist her breathing.54 After a few days, hospital physicians
recommended that the mother allow ventilator treatment to be
stopped and a "do not resuscitate order" to be issued on the
basis that such treatment was "medically unnecessary and inappropriate" due to the baby's anencephalic condition.5 The
mother refused the recommendation.
The physicians and the hospital then pursued an alternative
route-other than consent through the mother as a surrogate
decision maker-to discontinue treatment. First, they consulted
with the hospital ethics committee, which concluded that treatment should end because "such care is futile" and if the family
insisted on treatment the hospital should go to court. Second,
they transferred Baby K to a nursing home at a time when she
did not require the ventilator, but stipulated to treating her if
difficult breathing resumed. 56 Third, the hospital sought appointment of a guardian ad litem, who concluded treatment
should be withheld. Finally, the hospital turned to the court
seeking a declaratory judgment to determine their rights and obligations in rendering medical care to Baby K.57
53. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
54. 832 F. Supp. at 1025. "Baby K was diagnosed prenatally as being
anencephalic. Despite the counselling of her obstetrician and neonatologist that she
terminate her pregnancy, Mrs. H. refused to have her unborn child aborted." Id.
55. Id. The court used the following description of Baby K's condition:
Anencephaly is a congenital defect in which the brain stem is present but the
cerebral cortex is rudimentary or absent. There is no treatment that will
cure, correct, or ameliorate anencephaly. Baby K is permanently unconscious and cannot hear or see. Lacking a cerebral function, Baby K does not
feel pain. Baby K has brain stem functions primarily limited to reflexive
actions such as feeding reflexes (rooting, sucking, swallowing), respiratory
reflexes (breathing, coughing), and reflexive responses to sound or touch.
Baby K has a normal heart rate, blood pressure, liver function, digestion,
kidney function, and bladder function and has gained weight since her birth.
Most anencephalic infants die within days of birth.
Id. Under a do not resuscitate order, if Baby K went into respiratory or cardiac arrest
no ventilator treatment or cardiopulmonary resuscitation would be provided.
56. Baby K was transferred from the nursing home back to the hospital twice
from November 30, 1992 through April 13, 1993. The second time she received a
tracheotomy to install a tube in her neck so that ventilator treatment would be easier.
Id. at 1026.
57. Id. at 1027.
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Judge Claude Hilton heard evidence and arguments, and then
proceeded to whittle away at the hospital's request for declaratory relief from the application of federal and state laws relating
to the delivery of health care. First, the hospital wanted assurance that refusing ventilator treatment would not violate the
federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA).58 Under the statute, if an individual arrives at a
hospital with an emergency medical condition, treatment must
be provided or the individual stabilized for transfer to another
facility. 59 Based on the hospital's admission that Baby K meets
the statute's criteria when she arrives at the hospital in respiratory distress, Judge Hilton concluded that refusing to care for
her difficult breathing by withholding ventilator treatment
would violate EMTALA. 60 Tersely, the judge dismissed the hospital's position that an exemption from the statute should be
made when treatment is futile: "The plain language of the statute requires stabilization of an emergency medical condition.
The statute does not admit of any 'futility' or 'inhumanity' exceptions. Any argument to the contrary should be directed to
the U.S. Congress, not to the Federal Judiciary. "61
The judge considered two federal statutes protecting the
handicapped and disabled.62 First, under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, any discrimination against a handicapped individual
based solely on that handicap is impermissible. 63 Because an infant born with a congenital defect is included in that statute's
definition of "handicapped," Baby K is protected by the statute. 64 Therefore, the judge concluded that the hospital could
not withhold treatment solely because of Baby K's anencephalic
condition. 65 Second, withholding ventilator treatment would vi58. Id. at 1026. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. 1993).

59. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1).
60. 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
61. Id. In dicta, the judge stated that ventilator treatment was not futile in relieving respiratory difficulty because this was the emergency condition that must be
treated. Further, "[t]o hold otherwise would allow hospitals to deny emergency treat-

ment to numerous classes of patients, such as accident victims who have terminal
cancer or AIDS, on the grounds that they eventually will die anyway from those diseases and that emergency care for them would therefore be 'futile.'" Id.
62. Id. at 1026.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. 1993).
64. 832 F. Supp. at 1027 (citing Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610,624
(1986)).

65.

"Just as an AIDS patient seeking ear surgery is 'otherwise qualified' to receive

treatment despite poor long term prospects of living, Baby K is 'otherwise qualified'

to receive ventilator treatment despite similarly dismal health prospects." Id. at 1028.
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olate the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 66 In
general, the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled;
services offered for public accommodation, such as hospital
services, cannot be denied on the basis of a disability.67 Judge
Hilton reasoned that Baby K is disabled because of her
anencephalic condition, and that denying the benefits of ventilator services to anencephalic babies as a class of disabled individuals is not permitted.68
The court dismissed consideration of the Child Abuse
Amendments of 198469 as a state agency must bring suit in cases
of child abuse and neglect, and there is no private cause of action under the statute. In this case, the Virginia Child Protective
Services was not joined as a necessary party.7 ° Similarly, the
court declined to "elbow its way" into Virginia medical malpractice law because Virginia courts and the legislature had not addressed the standard of care for anencephalia. 7 ' This federal
court believed there were significant state interests in allowing
Virginia to settle the issue for itself. 72 Finally, Judge Hilton analyzed constitutional and common law issues, and determined
that the hospital must establish by "clear and convincing evidence" that it should interfere with the mother's "treatment decision. '73 "In this case, where the choice essentially devolves to
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1993).
67. Id. § 12112.
68. 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119 (Supp. 1993).
70. 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
71. Id. at 1029-30.
72. Id. at 1030. In general, federal district courts have "a duty to adjudicate controversies properly brought before them." Jones v. Griffith, 688 F. Supp. 446, 452-53
(N.D. Ind. 1988). Under the doctrine of abstention, for a district court to decline
jurisdiction is an extraordinary and narrow exception. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (quoting County of Allegheny
v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)). Usually, an appropriate circumstance for abstention is "where there have been presented difficult questions of state
law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import .. ." Itt at 814. Compare Jones v. Griffith, 688 F. Supp. at 454 (questions relating to standard of care in a
medical malpractice action brought by wife of deceased patient not of substantial
public importance).
73. 832 F. Supp. at 1031. In this case, the source of the clear and convincing standard for the hospital is vague, and the court seems to arrive at the standard through a
brief discussion of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Baby K and her
parents. First, the court stated the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment was
applicable because the mother had a strong religious belief in protecting life. Id. at
1030. In addition, the court seemed to apply a Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process analysis by referencing the Cruzan test of clear and convincing evidence,
which has been applied in right-to-die cases. Id. at 1031. In Cruzan, however, the
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a subjective determination as to the quality of Baby K's life, it
cannot be said that the continuation of Baby K's life is so unreasonably harmful as to constitute child abuse or neglect. ' 74 The
hospital appealed.
The Fourth Circuit simply reviewed the district court's analy-

sis of EMTALA and affirmed. 75 Like Judge Hilton, Judge Wil-

kins focused on whether difficulty with breathing qualified as an
emergency medical condition triggering the duty of the hospital
to stabilize under EMTALA. The hospital admitted ventilator
treatment was necessary to stabilize Baby K when she was
brought back to the hospital in respiratory distress, and failure
to treat would cause "serious impairment to bodily functions,"
which would trigger the duty to stabilize the infant or provide
for transfer.76 Because the mother objected to transfer and no

other facility would agree to admit Baby K, the hospital was
thus forced to treat. 77 "In sum, a straightforward application of
the statute obligates the Hospital to provide respiratory support
to Baby K when she arrives at the emergency department of the

Hospital in 78respiratory distress and treatment is requested on
her behalf.

Recognizing its hands were tied, the hospital tried to argue
around the language of the statute. First, it argued that EMTALA only requires uniform treatment of all patients with the
Supreme Court required that the parents offer clear and convincing evidence of their
adult daughter's wishes to withdraw treatment. Absent such evidence, the parents
could not request that the treatment be terminated. Unlike Cruzan, the issues in
Baby K involve an infant and a parent's demand for medical treatment. There does
not appear to be a standard for this novel situation, but Judge Hilton thought the
hospital needed to come forward with clear and convincing evidence that ventilator
treatment could be withheld against the mother's wishes. Id. at 1031. In medicine,
absent a legal obligation, there is no duty to treat. ANNAS, supra note 23, at 121.
Once the doctor-patient relationship is established, the obligation exists, but whether
a physician must render care that is not beneficial (futile) is not so clear. Because a
determination of what is futile medical care involves physician judgment, perhaps
shifting the burden of the clear and convincing test from the parents (or surrogate
decision maker) to the health care provider will safeguard patients' interests in these
unique situations.
74. 832 F. Supp. at 1031.
75. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 91 (1994). The panel did not
consider all the issues posed in the district court because once it concluded "that the
Hospital has a duty to render stabilizing treatment under EMTALA, we need not
address its obligations under the remaining federal statutes or the laws of Virginia."
Id. at 592 n.2.
76. Id. at 594.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 594-95.
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same condition.79 In this case, uniform treatment of
anencephalic infants was supportive care in the form of warmth,
nutrition, and hydration. The court disagreed because it thought
the hospital's argument for "uniform treatment" conflicted with
EMTALA's requirement for "stabilizing treatment." The court
concluded that it is respiratory distress that brings Baby K to the
hospital, not anencephaly, and this is the medical condition that
must be treated.8 0 In its second argument, the hospital contended that the standard of care for anencephaly was warmth,
nutrition, and hydration, and ventilator assistance was not consistent with this standard."' Again, the court dismissed the argument by relying on respiratory distress as the emergency
medical condition. Third, the hospital argued EMTALA must
yield to Virginia law, which permits physicians to refuse medical
care determined to be "medically or ethically inappropriate."'s
The court refused to apply this statute as EMTALA preempts
any state law conflicting with the requirement for stabilizing
treatment. Finally, the hospital urged that the requirement of
"stabilizing treatment" only applies if the baby is to be transferred to another facility. 83 The court disagreed with this interpretation of EMTALA, relying on precedent and holding
patients with an emergency medical condition must be treated
or transferred. 84 Finding the hospital's arguments "unavailing,"
the court affirmed. s
Judge Sprouse dissented. EMTALA was designed to prevent
hospital dumping of indigent or uninsured patients presented at
the emergency room; therefore, he disagreed with the application of the statute in this situation because there was "no sugges79.

Id. at 595.

80.

Id. at 596.

81. Id.
82. Health Care Decisions Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie Supp. 1993).
83. 16 F.3d at 597.
84. Id. at 598 (quoting Bruditt v. U. S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d
1362 (5th Cir. 1991)).
85. Id. at 595. The court refused to consider ethical standards when interpreting
statutory language and congressional intent.

EMTALA does not carve out an exception for anencephalic infants in respiratory distress any more than it carves out an exception for comatose patients, those with lung cancer, or those with muscular dystrophy-all of

whom may repeatedly seek emergency stabilizing treatment for respiratory
distress and also possess an underlying medical condition that severely affects their quality of life and ultimately may result in their death.

Id. at 598.
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tion of patient dumping." 86 Further, he agreed with the
hospital's argument that anencephaly was the "relevant condition" to be reviewed under EMTALA. 87 As a result, no violation would occur by withholding ventilator treatment because
that medical decision-if determined to be the appropriate standard of care for the condition-would apply to all anencephalic
infants. 88
III.

SEARCHING FOR A STANDARD

The Baby K opinions highlight the various standards applied
in making decisions about providing futile care. In general,
when courts examine the appropriateness of medical care, they
apply a legal standard that has both common law and statutory
origins. There is a legal duty placed on health care providers to
render reasonable care, which arises out of common law negligence actions; there are also legislatively imposed standards
such as those required under EMTALA. Some courts may inquire into medical standards and practice guidelines, which may
differ from legal standards, indicating that medical and legal
standards do not always correlate. Other courts may impose a
different standard when they consider the standard of care inappropriate, or hold that an alternative medical standard is reasonably supported.89 Finally, courts may consider ethical principles.
In end-of-life cases, however, courts are not likely to "devolve[ ]
to a subjective determination ..."90 Analysis of ethical principles is a source of circular debate, as like minds can disagree
when determining the "right" thing to do regardless of legal or
medical standards. 91 As a result, courts almost always rely on
legal standards and ignore ethical arguments unless they are
somehow incorporated into the law in question.
In Baby K, the district and appellate courts stuck to their task
of statutory interpretation, holding legal standards above ethical
principles and to some extent medical standards. While this is a
defensible and predictable outcome for the case, the courts
86.

Id.

87. Id. at 599.
88. Therefore, challenges to the medical decision or standard of care should be
through state malpractice actions. Id.
89.
sides);
90.
91.

See Morreim, supra note 21, at 38 (courts should grant ample leeway on both
see also Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974).
832 F. Supp. at 1031.
WING, supra note 19, at 13 (defining ethics as formal principles of conduct

recognized and enforced by sanctions employed by professional peers).
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could have used ethical and medical principles to determine a
standard that supported refusal of ventilator assistance treatment for anencephalic newborns. Judges Hilton and Wilkins,
however, were averse to engaging in an arguably legislative
function. Hilton stated the statute did not "admit of any 'futility'

. . .

exception," and any such argument was for the legisla-

ture. 92 Similarly, Wilkins agreed that the statute should apply
broadly and no exception should be made for anencephalic
infants.

3

On the other hand, Judge Sprouse in his dissent showed a
willingness to engage in a case-by-case analysis for extremely
narrow circumstances such as anencephaly. He disagreed that
withholding ventilator assistance from Baby K was akin to the
" 'dumping' of indigent or uninsured emergency patients," 94 the
primary evil EMTALA was meant to thwart. Yet, this case was
not about access to emergency care because Baby K's mother
was covered by Kaiser Permanente, a health maintenance organization, which agreed to cover the cost of treatment.95 The
only apparent basis for the resulting conflict between the health
care providers and the mother was a disagreement over making
an end-of-life decision. It is difficult to imagine that a federal
regulatory scheme governing patient dumping should apply to
"the sensitive decisionmaking process between family and physicians at the bedside of a helpless and terminally ill patient
" 96

Another concern for the district court was the apparent discrimination against Baby K due to her anencephalic condition.
Judge Hilton compared anencephalic infants to AIDS patients,
stating that because an AIDS patient may receive ear surgery
"despite poor long term prospects of living," an anencephalic
infant is similarly entitled to ventilator treatment. 97 While
anencephaly falls into a category of disabled or handicapped,
the condition cannot be compared to AIDS. An AIDS patient
may tragically have a shorter than expected life span, but it is
generally a fully conscious life. Further, there remains hope that
a treatment of a suppressed immune system is possible. In contrast, Baby K was not able to hear, see, think, or interact with
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

832 F. Supp. at 1027.
16 F.3d at 598.
Id.
Greenhouse, supra note 12.
16 F.3d at 598.
832 F. Supp. at 1028.
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others. 98 There is no cure that could have replaced her missing
brain to provide a chance of any sort of conscious life.99 This
does not mean that anencephalic infants should be denied medical treatment. On the contrary, the point is that perhaps a standard of care that dissuades aggressive technological intervention
for anencephalic infants should be recognized by the courts.
Finally, a more theoretical argument supposes that courts and
judges must protect the rights of individuals from majoritarian
rule making, and in this case Judges Hilton, Wilkins, and Williams were simply applying that principle. Judge Hilton stated
that "the Hospital must establish by clear and convincing evidence that [the mother's] treatment decision should not be
respected because it would constitute abuse or neglect of Baby
K."' 1 Further, Judge Wilkins remarked that "[t]he terms of
EMTALA as written do not allow the Hospital to fulfill its duty
to provide stabilizing treatment by simply dispensing uniform
treatment. Rather, the Hospital must provide that treatment
necessary to prevent the material deterioration of each patient's
emergency medical condition."'' 1
Admittedly, it is unclear whether the standard of care for
anencephalic newborns is to withhold ventilator assistance.
Nevertheless, even if hospital physicians considered such a
course the standard of care, there is always a chance a court
would apply an alternative standard and ignore the prevailing
standard of care. 0 2
IV. ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Currently, health care providers and insurers are looking to a
delivery system with stricter cost controls. It is probably not a
coincidence that the futility debate has emerged to rekindle issues such as patient autonomy, physician power in decision
making, rationing, technology utilization, defining life, and confronting death. So far, Baby K teaches us that physician medical
98. 16 F.3d at 599.
99. Id.
100. 832 F. Supp. at 1031.

101.

16 F.3d at 596.

102. See generally Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). In Helling, the
court applied its own reasonableness standard rather than that of the medical profes-

sion. Disregarding the apparent standard for ophthalmology, which did not require
glaucoma testing for patients under the age of 40, the court held as a matter of law
that the reasonableness standard required administration of the eye test to the patient
in that case. Id. at 983. Notably, the court's conclusion was based, in part, on the fact
that glaucoma tests were simple and relatively inexpensive.
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judgment must yield to the demands of the patient or the family
member. Even if other courts decide similar conflicts differently, the case readily illustrates that we have yet to seriously
consider setting limits to our health care system.
From a policy perspective, the futility debate includes all the
difficulties present in delivering medical services. It challenges
our political desire to create a system that is affordable, provides
quality medicine, and is accessible to everyone. If a primary
goal of health care reform is universal access to medical care
within limited financial constraints, then policy discussions
about futility must address resource limits or, in the alternative,
we must be prepared to pay higher costs. 10 3 To argue that economics should be left out of the debate because health care
providers should not be elevating financial motivation over dutiful patient care incorrectly denies that financial considerations
are central to this discussion."° Any reform initiatives calling
for universal medical care coverage or tighter cost controls will
consequently heighten the controversial futility debate.
In order to avoid unpleasant courtroom battles like Baby K, a
consensus needs to be reached about the meaning of medical
futility. Both health care providers and the general public need
to be involved in accepting standards that discourage aggressive
medical care for certain conditions unless we accept unilateral
decision making by physicians at the bedside. 105
Arguably, patient autonomy principles and the doctrine of informed consent suggest a consensus approach because much of
the futility debate may be circumvented by improved doctor-patient communications about the goals of medical treatment.0 6
Too often, provider interaction with the patient centers on treat103. See ANNAS, supra note 23, at 216-17 (stating that it is not possible to contain
costs unless we come to grips with our mortality; no plan is economically feasible
without limits, and no limits are feasible without recognition that quality of life is
more important than length of life). Cf. Miller & Tousignant, supra note 15 (quoting
Arthur Caplan, Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics, University of Minnesota: "The [PIresident and Congress are saying we must restrict our costs, and the
court is saying ... we will allow a single mother to defy the opinion of doctors and

continue care in what must arguably be the most hopeless of circumstances.").
104.

Veatch & Spicer, supra note 5, at 36 (arguing allocation decisions are not for

physicians but society).
105.

Brennan, supra note 22, at 336 (resisting unilateral decision making about

futile care).
106.

Stuart J. Youngner, Futility in Context, 264 JAMA 1295, 1296 (1990) (physi-

cians should inform patients and families about futile care decisions in order to resolve the problem at bedside); Truog et al., supra note 33, at 1562 (communication
should resolve many of the conflicts).
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ment of a specific condition, and the patient becomes simply an
organ or body system. As a result, it may be difficult for the
doctor to discuss overall treatment goals with the patient, and
couching decisions in vague terminology such as 'it would be
medically inappropriate to proceed with that course of treatment' allows physicians to avoid discussions about how a patient
wants to or is going to die.1°7
Here, ethics committees or medical ethicists could play a role
in educating attending and resident physicians about the value
of early communication with patients. This could preempt later
liability-motivated decision making, and preserve patient input
into the course of the patient's own medical treatment. 10 8
While educational efforts offer long-term solutions, interim
incentives are needed to stimulate doctor-patient discussion
about futile care. Such methods to encourage earlier communication with patients about end-of-life decisions include setting
restrictive practice guidelines for physicians to follow in difficult
cases; 1°9 amending ethical standards and hospital protocols to
create community-wide agreement on treatment practices; 110
and reimbursement for documented quality-of-life patient visits,
107. "Terms that signal to patients that 'there is nothing more medically to be
done' make discussion of tough value questions unnecessary and help physicians
avoid painful explorations with their patients." Solomon, supra note 23, at 235-36;
Mildred Z. Solomon et al., DecisionsNear the End of Life: ProfessionalViews on LifeSustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 14 (1993) (demonstrating inadequate
communication between doctors and patients in advance of crises and inadequate
documentation of patient preferences).
108. Solomon et al., supra note 107, at 19 (patient preference documentation inadequate); Solomon, supra note 23, at 234 (lack of knowledge about ethics and law
creates exaggerated concern about liability); Brennen, supra note 22, at 336 (use ethics committees to educate providers and the public); Stell, supra note 8, at 497 (involve ethics committees to resolve clashes with patients).
109. Miles, supra note 41, at 513 (practice guidelines); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87 (on development of clinical practice guidelines).
110. Alpers & Lo, supra note 8, at 328 (calling for more societal input before
letting physicians make futility decisions). Some health care communities are trying
to reach a consensus on the standard of care for futile medical conditions. For example, a novel project is under way in Denver to create and implement a community
standard for treating futile medical conditions. The project, Guidelines for Use of
Intensive Care in Denver (GUIDE), is bringing together hospital and community
leaders in an attempt to reach a consensus on how to treat, or rather not treat, certain
medical conditions that most people would consider inappropriate. See Definition of
Futility No Longer a Purely Medical Decision, Hosp. ETHICS, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 5.
By including the public in the discussions, the hope is to create a policy that will be
accepted as the standard for the community. Id.
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which utilizes more persuasive financial incentives to alter physician behavior.111
In theory, a refusal of care is effortless, but at the patient's
bedside with family members present, the physician faces a
much harder task. In its current form, the use of the term medical futility is inappropriate because it allows physicians to withdraw from these interpersonal confrontations with the patient
and family, and make private, unilateral decisions about the
course of treatment.' 2 Such practice should not occur because
it ultimately pits the physician against patient. A better approach counsels physicians to interact earlier with patients in
end-of-life decisions in an3 attempt to reach a consensus on appropriate medical care."
CONCLUSION

Where tension exists between physicians making medical
judgments and patients demanding treatment, the patient apparently will prevail. As the Baby K opinions suggest, courts are
compelled to favor individual rights under current federal statutes and case law. In addition, while earlier right-to-die decisions revealed that courts were willing under limited
circumstances to let individuals refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment, here, judges were not willing to let physicians refuse
to provide treatment contrary to the patient's or surrogate's
wishes. Arguably, withdrawing or refusing a life-saving treatment is a form of passive suicide. However, perhaps nontreatment for certain diagnoses should be adopted as the standard of
care. That is, health care providers or the legislature should be
permitted to develop criteria for making end-of-life decisions,
which would allow physicians-in an extremely narrow case
such as anencephaly-to decide that aggressive treatment is not
the best course of therapy.
To the best of our knowledge, Baby K could not think or feel,
and her ability to survive was uncertain even with periodic ventilator intervention." 4 In similar instances, should a court allow
111. Allowing the doctor to bill the patient's health insurance company for discussions about what type of care the patient will receive should effect some basic communication about making end-of-life decisions. See Solomon et al., supra note 107, at 21.
112. Solomon, supra note 23, at 235-36.
113. See Lantos et al., supra note 30, at 83 (framework for these determinations
should be one of shared decision making).
114. See The Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant with Anencephaly,
322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 669 (1990).
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physicians to refuse mechanical ventilation, or must it defer to
the wishes of the infant's parent and mandate treatment? The
issues are dying and who should control the decision of how and
when death will occur.' 15 Perhaps, in this limited context, medical judgment or a consensus of decision makers such as an ethics
committee should be favored. If not, legislatures must become
involved in the difficult task of setting limits to our health care
system unless we are willing to spend unlimited financial resources preserving a tragically ill patient for whom no known
treatment exists.

115.

See, e.g., Kathryn A. Koch et al., Analysis of Power in Medical Decision-Mak-

ing: An Argument for Physician Autonomy, 20 L.

MED.

&

HEALTH CARE

320, 322

(1992) (describing the power struggle at the bedside).
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